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THE PROSECUTOR’S ROLE: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR DAVIS
Randall D. Eliason*
Editor’s Note: The following article is in response to
Prosecutorial Misconduct: An Abuse of Power and
Discretion, 1 CRIM. L. BRIEF 16 (2006), by American
University Washington College of Law Professor and former
Director of the Public Defender Service for the District of
Columbia, Angela Davis. In her article, which appeared in
the last issue of this journal, Professor Davis argued that
there is a widespread culture of prosecutorial misconduct
that has gone unchecked by the courts, that this misconduct
has reached epidemic proportions, and that the legal profession must take the lead in instituting meaningful reform.
Professor Davis’s article can be found at:
http://www.wcl.american.edu/journals/clb/

“The United States wins its point whenever
justice is done its citizens in the courts.” 1
Johnny St. Valentine Brown, Jr. was a veteran narcotics detective. Brown – who went by the nickname “Jehru” –
had nearly thirty years of experience investigating drug cases
on the streets of the District of Columbia. He had worked as an
undercover officer buying drugs, as a detective investigating
major drug rings, and in virtually all other aspects of narcotics
law enforcement. He had worked for the federal government in
the Office of National Drug Control Policy and as an investigator for a congressional committee studying drug trafficking.
Brown was so good that the D.C. United States Attorney’s
Office regularly asked him to teach new prosecutors about illegal drugs and how they are used, packaged, and sold. When I
joined the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 1989, Brown gave the narcotics lecture to my training class of new Assistant U.S.
Attorneys.
Jehru’s real fame, however, was as an expert witness.
Almost all criminal drug cases, even the most routine, require
the prosecution to present a “drug expert.” These witnesses,
usually experienced narcotics investigators, testify about such
matters as police procedures for handling drug evidence and the
packaging and sale of illegal drugs on the street. Due to the volume of drug prosecutions, these experts are in great demand.
Good ones may testify in several different cases in a single day.
As a drug expert, Brown was a prosecutor’s dream.
He was good looking, well-dressed, and charismatic, with a rich
baritone voice. He would turn and speak directly to the jury
when testifying, like a college professor patiently instructing a
class of freshmen. He was always professional, always prepared, incredibly knowledgeable, and never lost his cool. Juries
loved him. Defense lawyers feared him. Prosecutors would
rearrange the order of witnesses they intended to call, just to
accommodate Jehru’s busy schedule. Brown was not only
good, he was prolific. According to one report, by the late
1990’s Brown had testified in more than four thousand trials in
twenty-six jurisdictions and one hundred and twelve cities,
although his primary venue was the District of Columbia.2
Expert witnesses usually begin their testimony by discussing their background and training, in order to establish their
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qualifications. Brown was no exception, and each time he testified he began with a lengthy recitation of his considerable
experience. It was almost a matter of rote; while he was talking to the jury about his background, prosecutors would review
their notes and defense attorneys would plan their cross-examination. Everyone who tried drug cases knew Jehru. Everyone
knew he was eminently qualified and that there could be no
serious challenge to his expertise.
In the summer of 1999, Brown was retained by the
D.C. government as an expert witness for the defense in a civil
case. The government was being sued by the family of a young
man who was killed while working as a confidential informant
for the police. When the plaintiff’s lawyer took his deposition,
Brown testified that in addition to his extensive experience
within the police department, he had earned a graduate degree
from the Howard University School of Pharmacy. The plaintiff’s lawyer was unfamiliar with Brown and decided to check
him out. With a few phone calls, he learned that Brown had
never attended Howard University, much less obtained a
degree. When the civil attorney exposed these lies, Brown was
removed as an expert witness in the case.3
This all came to light while I was serving as the Chief
of the Public Corruption/Government Fraud section of the U.S.
Attorney’s Office – the unit charged with prosecuting police
misconduct. Our review of the transcripts in a few recent drug
cases confirmed our fears: Brown had told similar lies in a number of criminal trials while testifying as an expert for the prosecution. He had regularly claimed to have earned an undergraduate or graduate degree in pharmacology from Howard
University in the 1960’s. In a number of cases he had falsely
testified that he was a board-certified pharmacist. Sometimes
he had testified that he actually worked for a time as a pharmacist, dispensing prescription drugs at several local drugstores
and grocery stores. These claims had been made during the rote
recitations of his credentials that lawyers in drug cases had
heard so many times, and had gone unchallenged by both prosecutors and defense attorneys.
Faced with what we had learned, my colleagues and I
had to decide what to do. We considered it extremely unlikely
that Brown’s lies had actually affected the outcome of any
cases. There was no evidence that he had lied about anything
other than his own credentials. He had testified only as an
expert, he was not a fact witness who identified the particular
defendants or testified about their involvement in the case. The
matters about which he testified were generally uncontroversial
and could have been testified to by scores of other experts.
Most significantly, Brown’s true expertise was based on his
years of work on the streets as a narcotics investigator; any formal education that he did or did not have paled in significance
next to that experience. Nevertheless, although the prosecutors
had not known it at the time, our office now had information
that a government witness had lied under oath in numerous
cases that had resulted in criminal convictions. We also knew
that most defense attorneys who had represented clients in those
cases probably were unaware that this was even an issue, and
likely would remain unaware – unless we told them about it.
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So we told them about it. The U.S. Attorney’s office
about my concerns, and he said I was authorized to do what I
identified every case we could in which Brown had testified for
thought was best. On the morning of trial, I walked into court
us as an expert. We wrote to all defense counsel in those cases
and dismissed the case.
and informed them of the potential issue, in order to allow them
In a more recent and much more high-profile case, fedto review the records and consider filing any appropriate
eral prosecutors in Alexandria, Virginia were seeking the death
motions. We also wrote letters to the local and federal public
penalty in the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui. Moussaoui,
defender’s offices notifying them of the potential problems with
the so-called “twentieth hijacker,” was accused of being
Brown’s testimony. In addition, we published a notice about
involved in the plotting that led up to the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. During the trial, an attorney for the
Brown’s perjury in the Daily Washington Law Reporter, a widely-read local legal periodical, to try to get the word out to as
Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) committed a
flagrant violation of the court’s orders. The attorney (who was
many defense attorneys as possible.4 In a few cases where we
not a prosecutor but had been working with the prosecution
believed Brown’s testimony was arguably more consequential,
team) e-mailed transcripts of trial testimony to upcoming govwe voluntarily agreed to vacate the convictions or allowed the
ernment witnesses, thus sharing with them what other witnessdefendants to plead guilty to lesser charges. In dozens of other
es had said. This was a violation of the so-called “rule on witcases, defense attorneys filed motions to vacate the convictions,
nesses” typically invoked in almost every case. The TSA attorand those motions were resolved by a judge.5
ney also appeared to be coaching the witnesses on how to shape
We also indicted Brown on multiple counts of perjury
6
their upcoming testimony.7
and sent him to federal prison.
How did the judge learn of this misconduct?
Nearly ten years before the Jehru inciThe
prosecutors told her. As soon as they
dent, when I was prosecuting narcotics cases in
I
have
always
believed
that,
learned
of the TSA attorney’s actions, the prosfederal court, a case was transferred to me that
as
a
prosecutor,
you
can’t
ecutors
notified the court and defense counsel,
was about to go to trial. The defendant was
who
did
not know about it and who may have
charged with distribution of crack cocaine. It stand in front of a jury and
never
learned
about it. The prosecutors did so
was a typical “buy-bust” case. In such a case, a ask them to do something you
even
though
they
knew the revelation would do
team of investigators went to a known drug marwould not do yourself.
tremendous
damage
to the most important case
ket and an undercover officer walked into the
of
their
careers.
In
court
papers disclosing the
area to buy drugs. After a successful purchase,
TSA
attorney’s
actions
to
the
court and defense,
the undercover officer would leave the area and
8
The
the
prosecutors
called
her
behavior
“reprehensible.”
radio a description of the seller to an arrest team waiting nearjudge,
when
explaining
to
the
jury
what
had
happened,
noted
by. The arrest team (also called the “jump outs”) would then
that the prosecutors deserved “great credit” for bringing the
drive quickly to the area, jump out of their vehicles, and stop the
matter to the court’s attention.9
suspect who fit the description. The undercover officer would
None of these stories strike me as particularly remarkcome by in a car and make a “drive-by identification,” telling
able or noble. They are simply examples of prosecutors doing
the jump outs whether they had the right person. If the identitheir jobs and trying to do the right thing. These stories would
fication was positive, the suspect would be placed under arrest.
seem strangely out of place, however, in the prosecutorial world
I had handled dozens of such cases, as had every prosecutor in
described by Professor Angela J. Davis in the debut issue of this
the narcotics section.
As I began to prepare for trial, however, some things
Journal (Prosecutorial Misconduct: An Abuse of Power and
about this particular case didn’t feel right. The more I examined
Discretion, Criminal Law Brief, Spring 2006). Professor Davis
argues that prosecutorial misconduct is widespread and routine
the evidence, listened to the tapes of the police radio transmissions, and interviewed the officers, the more uncomfortable I
and has reached epidemic proportions.10 She claims that prosbecame. No single glaring problem stood out, but based on my
ecutors consistently and deliberately violate their ethical and
experience with many such cases, I was troubled. Too many litprofessional obligations, and even break the law, in pursuit of a
tle things did not add up. I began to doubt whether the police
“win at any cost” agenda.11
had actually arrested the right person.
In the world portrayed by Professor Davis, the U.S.
I knew that if I took the case to trial, there was a good
Attorney’s Office no doubt would have tried to bury the inforchance the defendant would be convicted. After all, the undermation about Detective Brown’s lies in the criminal trials, in
cover officer was ready to testify that the defendant was the
hopes that defense attorneys would never learn about them. We
same man who had sold him the drugs. Jurors who had not seen
certainly would not have prosecuted our former star witness for
many such cases before might not pick up on some of the issues
perjury, thus calling attention both to his misdeeds and to our
that were bothering me, and the defense attorney might miss
own failure to notice them. In that world, I vigorously would
some or all of them as well. I knew my doubts could be wrong,
have sought to convict the defendant in the drug case, despite
and that the defendant might well be guilty. But I also knew
my personal doubts, in order to add another “win” notch to my
that the defendant was facing a mandatory minimum ten-year
belt. The prosecutors in the Moussaoui trial would have simply
sentence, and that I would be the one putting him in jail.
instructed their witnesses to say nothing about how they had
I have always believed that, as a prosecutor, you can’t
been improperly coached and would have gone on with their
stand in front of a jury and ask them to do something you would
case. But fortunately for the criminal justice system, and for all
not do yourself. I was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
of us, Professor Davis has painted a seriously flawed and disof this defendant’s guilt, so I knew I could not in good contorted picture of what prosecutors do every day.
science ask a jury to convict him. I spoke with my supervisor
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Let me be clear at the outset: my aim is neither to deny
that prosecutorial misconduct occurs nor to condone it when it
does. There are more than 35,000 prosecutors working around
the country in more than 2,300 state and local prosecutor’s
offices, U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and at the Department of
Justice.12 Any time you have a human enterprise that large, you
are going to have some people who will break the rules. There
are bad prosecutors, just as there are bad corporate CEO’s, bad
doctors, bad bankers, and bad defense attorneys. And because
prosecutors wield a great deal of power, a prosecutor with corrupt motives can cause tremendous harm. True prosecutorial
misconduct, when it occurs, should be condemned and swiftly
punished.
Prosecutorial misconduct, however, is the exception,
not the norm. When it does take place, good prosecutors – who
know how serious true misconduct is and who must live with
the fallout and damage to the reputation of their profession – are
perhaps more upset by it than most people. The vast majority
of prosecutors are dedicated public servants striving to do a difficult job in an ethical and honorable way. The prosecutorial
world described by Professor Davis would be completely alien
to them, as it is to me.
The Prosecutor’s Role
A criminal defense lawyer’s duty is to her client. Her
job is to represent her client zealously within the bounds of law
and ethics and to try to win, even if she knows her client is
guilty. She has no obligation to seek the truth; in fact, in many
cases, she will be doing her job if she can obscure the truth and
keep it from coming to light.13
The prosecutor, however, has a different role, one
unlike that of any other advocate. That role was most famously described by the Supreme Court decades ago:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation togovern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor – indeed, he should do so. But while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.14
Many other cases have likewise recognized this duty of a prosecutor to seek to do justice and not merely to win.15
Prosecutors are expected to be zealous, but are to temper that
zeal with a recognition of their broader obligations. As one former prosecutor has written, “[p]rosecutors of course are not as
impartial as judges, nor are they asked to be. But they are asked
to be more impartial than defense attorneys.”16
The unique role of the prosecutor also is recognized in
various ethical and professional standards. The American Bar
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which
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have been adopted by nearly every state,17 include Rule 3.8,
entitled “Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.”18 Rule 3.8
provides, among other things, that a prosecutor must not knowingly bring charges not supported by probable cause, must work
to ensure that the rights of the defendant are protected, and must
make timely disclosure to the defense of all exculpatory evidence (also known as Brady19 material). The American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice similarly provide
that the “duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to
convict.”20 The National District Attorneys Association
Prosecution Standards state that the “primary responsibility of
prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished.”21
Each day, in thousands of cases around the country,
prosecutors decline to bring indictments, dismiss charges, turn
over evidence favorable to the defense, and take countless other
actions that benefit criminal defendants or make prosecuting a
case more difficult. They do it because it’s their job, and their
professional obligation, to be focused on something more than
simply winning. Their duties require them to do their best to
play by the rules, respect the rights of the accused, be completely candid with the court, and above all, to be certain they are
prosecuting the right people.
These obligations were drilled into me from the beginning of my time at the U.S. Attorney’s office.22 Over the years,
I attended – and later taught – numerous training sessions on
issues such as Brady obligations, charging decisions, and the
proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion. I attended professional conferences with other prosecutors from around the
country, where we shared our experiences and talked about how
best to fulfill our obligations while doing our jobs. I participated in countless discussions with colleagues concerning such
issues as whether to bring particular charges, whether to investigate a particular defendant, or whether certain evidence constituted Brady material. We often wrestled with these issues,
not to decide how best to win (because then the decision is easy)
but to decide how best to fulfill our legal and ethical responsibilities during the course of a prosecution.
Many may believe the notion that prosecutors would
actually seek to do justice is nothing more than a quaint platitude. Prosecutors are often portrayed in books and movies as
ruthless, political animals bent on winning at any cost, even if
it means knowingly convicting the innocent. Some of the
recent excesses of the current Justice Department in alleged furtherance of the fight against terrorism have further added to
public skepticism of law enforcement. In this cynical age, it is
easy to dismiss the special obligation of prosecutors as simply
a naïve and unrealistic ideal.
I don’t agree. To most prosecutors – and to all good
prosecutors – this duty to seek justice really does mean something. It becomes ingrained as part of your professional identity. I saw it practiced every day during my twelve years as an
Assistant U.S. Attorney. Prosecutors may not always agree
with each other, and certainly may not always agree with
defense counsel, about how best to fulfill that obligation in a
given situation. But they always know that the obligation is
there.
It is interesting, although perhaps not surprising, that
those commentators who believe that prosecutors do in fact
seek to meet this higher obligation tend to be former prosecutors,23 while those who are the most vocal about alleged wide-
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spread prosecutorial misconduct tend to be current or former
criminal defense attorneys.24 In my experience, relations
between prosecutors and defense attorneys are generally collegial and certainly no worse than relations among attorneys in
other segments of the bar. It has also been my experience, however, that some criminal defense attorneys – particularly those
who, like Professor Davis, work or have worked as public
defenders – have very strong feelings about prosecutors. They
seem to believe that prosecutors are morally suspect, simply by
virtue of their profession. Indeed, in the title of a recent article,
one former public defender went so far as to ask, “Can you be a
good person and a good prosecutor?”25 Her answer: probably
not.26
I have no quarrel with the role of the defense attorney
in the criminal justice system: to represent her client with vigor
and put the government to its proof. I do take issue, however,
with Professor Davis’s portrayal of how prosecutors operate
within that same system. The prosecutor’s role carries with it a
unique set of obligations. Seeking to fulfill the duty to do justice
is the foundation of the prosecutor’s job, and is at the heart of
every good prosecutor’s professional identity. There is no basis
for the claim that prosecutors are routinely disregarding these
ethical and legal obligations to “abuse [their] power and discretion.”27

ment that the jury should “send a message” on behalf of the community by finding the defendant guilty.33 This is considered
improper because the jury is supposed to focus only on the facts
and whether the government has proved its case, not on pursuing
social policy by sending messages.34 In another D.C. case, it was
held to be misconduct when the prosecutor in closing argument
referred to the victim of a brutal homicide as having been “shot
down like a dog in the street” and called the killing an “assassination.”35 The court said these statements were an improper
attempt to inflame the passions of the jury.36
One can debate the merits of the rulings in such cases.
All can agree, however, that this type of so-called “misconduct”
by an advocate in the middle of trial is fundamentally different
from the behavior of a prosecutor who deliberately buries exculpatory evidence or knowingly prosecutes an innocent man. All
of these wide-ranging acts, however, are routinely grouped
together under the single heading of “prosecutorial misconduct.”37
Nor are the rules about what will constitute “misconduct” always clear. For example, some cases hold that it is prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument to call the defendant or
a witness a liar.38 Other cases, however, have found that this this
is not misconduct.39 In any event, it is fine to argue that the evidence proves a witness’s testimony could not be true (in other
words, the witness is lying) as long as you don’t use the “L”
Prosecutorial “Misconduct” vs. Prosecutorial Error
word.40 Similarly, a prosecutor cannot vouch for a witness by
saying “I believe he was telling you the truth,” but is free to
argue, “the evidence shows that he was telling you the truth,”
The first difficulty with Professor Davis’s analysis lies
which of course tells the jury exactly what the prosecutor
in the term “prosecutorial misconduct” itself. Although this
believes.41 The “shot down like a dog in the street” line was held
problem did not originate with Professor Davis, it severely
to be unduly inflammatory, but other cases have
undermines her arguments. The problem is this:
upheld language that seems indistinguishable or
much of what is labeled “prosecutorial misconeven worse, including such lines as calling the
duct” is not “misconduct” at all, at least not as
“The United States Attorney
that term is commonly understood.
defendant a “sadistic killer.”42 Distinctions are
The word “misconduct” generally is the representative ... of a made in the minds of appellate judges that likely
denotes some kind of intentional wrongdoing.28 sovereignty whose obligation are lost on juries, as well as on most advocates.43
“Prosecutorial misconduct” therefore suggests ... in a criminal prosecution Even seasoned prosecutors are sometimes uncerthat the prosecutor has purposely acted in a way is not that it shall win a case, tain where the lines will be drawn.
that is unfair, unethical, or even illegal. In truth,
There are several important points to note
but that justice shall be
however, “prosecutorial misconduct” is a catch
about this category of “prosecutorial miscondone.”
phrase used by the courts to describe virtually
duct” – the category that I suggest would better
anything done by the prosecution in a criminal
be called “prosecutorial error.” First, the errors
Justice Sutherland
case that is subject to objection and possible legal
take place in open court. The defense attorney is
able to object, and the trial judge is able to interchallenge.29 Use of the term says nothing about
vene, admonish the prosecutor, and issue a curative instruction to
the prosecutor’s intent or lack of good faith.30
the jury if necessary. Nothing is done in secret or concealed from
In many cases, the label “prosecutorial misconduct” is
the defense, the jury, or the judge. The defense attorney is able
actually quite unfair to the prosecutor. It is applied even to routo follow up with her own questioning and argument and may
tine, inadvertent missteps that may be made by advocates in any
even be able to exploit the “misconduct” by suggesting to the
case – the kinds of mistakes that everyone who tries cases will
jury that the prosecution is not playing fair.
make from time to time. It may refer to asking an improper quesSecond, these types of errors are not committed only by
tion, mentioning evidence that has not been properly admitted, or
prosecutors. Defense attorneys also make improper arguments,
making a misstatement during closing argument. Such mistakes
refer to inadmissible evidence, and harass witnesses, both intencan occur as a result of inexperience, nerves, carelessness, a mistionally and inadvertently.44 Indeed, given their duty of zealous
judgment about what the law allows, or simply through an excess
representation, they may be more likely to do so than the proseof zeal in the heat of battle. The mistakes may still be serious and
cutor, who has to worry about her obligations to justice and about
may even justify reversal of a conviction, but they are not “miscreating appellate issues.45 The difference is that a defense
conduct” as that term is commonly understood.31 In such cases,
lawyer who breaks the rules, even deliberately, likely will receive
a more appropriate term would be “prosecutorial error.”32
at worst a scolding from the judge. A prosecutor who makes
Let me provide a couple of examples. In the District of
even an honest mistake, however, will be branded as having
Columbia, as well as in other jurisdictions, it is generally considengaged in “misconduct.”
ered misconduct for the prosecutor to say during closing argu-
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As Professor Davis notes, alleged Brady violations are
another common source of claims of prosecutorial misconduct.46
Brady violations take place when the government fails to fulfill
its obligation to disclose material information in the government’s possesion that is favorable to the defense.47 Again, however, simply labeling something a “Brady violation” tells you
nothing about the underlying circumstances or the motives of
the prosecutor, and the fact that a Brady violation is found does
not mean that the prosecutor engaged in willful misbehavior.
The good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant to the
Brady analysis.48 In fact, a Brady violation may be found
where the prosecutor himself didn’t even know about the information that was not disclosed, as long as the police or someone
else on the prosecution team was aware of it.49
Brady material can range from compelling evidence
that clearly exculpates the accused to evidence that is arguably
cumulative and may not even be admissible. Most difficult
Brady questions involve judgment calls about the value of the
evidence, and reasonable people can disagree. Trial judges and
appellate judges themselves often differ over whether particular
information was Brady material. As a prosecutor, however, if
you make a good-faith decision about Brady material and a
judge later disagrees, you haven’t just made a mistake: you’ve
engaged in “prosecutorial misconduct.”
Simply looking at statistics about the number of cases
that discuss prosecutorial misconduct or Brady violations therefore tells you very little about what actually happened in those
cases. Such statistics also greatly overstate the incidence of true
willful misbehavior by the prosecution. Most cases involving
allegations of “prosecutorial misconduct” do not involve deliberate wrongful conduct by the prosecution, and would more
accurately be characterized as prosecutorial error.50 Lumping
all of these cases together under the heading “prosecutorial misconduct” obscures the very different issues and concerns that
underlie the different types of claims, and makes the problem of
true willful misconduct sound far greater than it actually is.

It’s Called Harmless Error for a Reason
As Professor Davis points out, most cases involving
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are upheld under the
“harmless error” doctrine.51 In other words, courts usually find
that the events labeled “prosecutorial misconduct” did not
affect the fundamental fairness of the trial or call into question
the result, and thus do not require a new trial. This would be
harder to understand if most prosecutorial misconduct actually
involved deliberate wrongdoing by the prosecution. It makes
sense, however, when we realize that much that is labeled “misconduct” when done by the prosecution is better understood
simply as trial error, and often harmless error at that.
Professor Davis seems to suggest that the harmless
error standard is somehow illegitimate, a way for judges to
ignore or excuse the misbehavior of prosecutors. The harmless
error doctrine, she argues, demonstrates that the courts place a
“higher premium on affirming convictions than [on] punishing
prosecutors who do wrong.”52 The problem with this claim is
that it suggests (incorrectly) that most allegations of “misconduct” involve willful misbehavior that would make “punishment” appropriate. Because most of what is termed misconduct
does not involve deliberate wrongdoing, this criticism is mis-
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placed.
The harmless error doctrine, of course, was not something invented by judges to allow them to excuse prosecutorial
misconduct. In federal cases, for example, the harmless error
standard is contained in both the Criminal Rules and the United
States Code and applies to all aspects of a trial, not just to mistakes by prosecutors.53 Furthermore, it’s not clear exactly what
Professor Davis would propose as an alternative. She may
believe it would be more appropriate if any finding of prosecutorial error – whether deliberate or not, and no matter how trivial or inconsequential in the scheme of the overall trial – resulted in the automatic reversal of a conviction. This is an argument that a defendant is entitled to a perfect trial, not merely a
fair one. That is a worthy ideal but is something that has never
been required and, given the frailties of human actors, probably
can never be achieved.54
It is true that most cases where prosecutorial misconduct is alleged are not reversed on appeal. This is not because
judges are blindly allowing prosecutors to run roughshod over
the rights of defendants. Rather, it is because most claims of
prosecutorial “misconduct” are either without merit or involve
what is better characterized as prosecutorial error. It’s easy for
the defense to cry “prosecutorial misconduct” and attempt to
create an issue on appeal, and this is increasingly done as a
defense tactic. In reality, however, most such claims have little
basis. Most of the errors that do occur truly are harmless, and
characterizing them as “misconduct” doesn’t change that.
Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics55
The second major flaw in Professor Davis’s analysis is
the lack of any empirical basis for her claims of widespread, flagrant prosecutorial misconduct. The few studies on which she
does purport to rely do not come close to supporting her conclusions.
To bolster her claims about an “epidemic” of prosecutorial misconduct, Professor Davis relies primarily on two studies.56 The first, by the nonpartisan Center for Public Integrity
(“CPI”), examined 11,452 cases in which allegations of prosecutorial conduct were reviewed by appellate judges. The study
looked at cases over about a 30-year period.58 The second
study involved a series published in the Chicago Tribune in
1999 by reporters Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley.59 This
study also examined about 11,000 cases, this time over a 36year period.60
A few points need to be made about these studies.
First, as discussed above, statistics on the number of cases
involving allegations of prosecutorial misconduct or Brady violations say nothing about the intent of the prosecutors, the
underlying merits of the allegations, or whether true professional misconduct was involved. In the CPI study, of the more than
11,000 cases reviewed only about 2,000 resulted in reversal of
a conviction or other relief to the defendant.61 In the great
majority of cases, either the claim of misconduct was not
upheld or the misconduct was found to be harmless error –
again, most likely because the “misconduct” was in fact simply
a trial error or minor Brady violation that did not affect the trial.
Similarly, the Chicago Tribune study found that convictions
were reversed in only 381 of the 11,000 cases studied.62
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eye. These activities provide many opportunities for misconI do not condone or excuse the conduct of any proseduct that may never come to light. Because they have the
cutor found to have engaged in true misconduct. Any intentionopportunity, she argues, prosecutors routinely and purposefully
al misconduct by the prosecution is reprehensible and must be
taken seriously. At the same time, however, these numbers have
engage in misconduct, believing they will never be caught.71
to be considered in context. The 2,000 cases of serious misconOf course, defense attorneys also do a great many
duct over 30 years found in the CPI study works out to a rate of
things in secret. Defense attorneys may mislead, intimidate, or
about 66 cases per year; the 381 reversals in 36 years in the
even threaten witnesses when meeting with them prior to trial.
Tribune study is an average of about 11 cases per year. By conThey have the opportunity to coach witnesses, including their
trast, in 2003 there were more than 70,000 federal criminal
clients, to commit perjury, and knowingly to sponsor perjured
cases filed in the United States District Courts, and more than
testimony. They have the ability to destroy or otherwise tamper with physical evidence. There have certainly been docutwenty million criminal cases filed in state courts.63 Even if we
limit the state criminal cases to felonies, the number is still
mented cases of all of these things occurring,72 and all of this
nearly three million.64 Sixty-six cases a year out of several miltakes place outside of the public eye. Indeed, unlike proseculion is a vanishingly small number. Even if the true incidence
tors, defense attorneys are unhampered by any special ethical
responsibilities to be fair or to seek the truth, and they know for
of prosecutorial misconduct, reported and unreported, were 500
certain that their actions will never be reviewed as part of a
times greater than what was found in the CPI study, it would
still involve only about one percent of all serious criminal cases
claim of “misconduct.” Presumably they would feel even more
filed in a year.
at liberty than prosecutors to engage in secret wrongdoing.
There are about 30,000 state and local
Applying Professor Davis’s reasoning, then, are
prosecutors in the United States and more than
we to conclude that deliberate misconduct by
5,000 more working for the Department of
defense attorneys is widespread and has reached
65
I
believe
that
most
prosecuepidemic proportions? I think not, although my
Sixty-six cases of misconduct in a
Justice.
year means that fewer than one-fifth of one per- tors, most of the time, try to logic and evidence are just as compelling as hers
cent of all prosecutors were found to have com- uphold their duty to seek jus- – which is to say, not compelling at all.
If history teaches us anything, it is that the
mitted misconduct. If we assume that the truly
tice and do not engage in
bad prosecutors are recidivists with multiple
truth has a way of coming out.73 Some witnessdeliberate
misconduct.
claims of misconduct filed against them, then
es who are abused will report what happened to
the number of individual prosecutors involved
them. Evidence that was thought to be
destroyed will come to light in another form.
is even smaller.66
Individuals victimized by misconduct or scanThese are hardly “epidemic” numbers.
dal will come forward to report it. If this pervasive, secretive
If anything, the data from these studies actually demonstrates
“culture of misconduct” existed, at least some of the hundreds
that prosecutorial misconduct is quite rare.67 Recognizing the
of thousands of people involved in various aspects of law
limitations of what they had found, the authors of the CPI study
enforcement would come forward as whistleblowers to expose
noted that “[m]ost of the nation’s approximately 30,000 local
it. It is simply implausible to suggest that prosecutorial miscontrial prosecutors strive to balance their understandable desire to
duct is as widespread and routine as Professor Davis claims, but
win – a desire supported by the vast majority of the citizenry –
we just don’t hear about it.
with their duty to ensure justice.”68 One will search in vain for
There is no empirical support for Professor Davis’s
any such acknowledgement by Professor Davis.
charges of rampant prosecutorial misconduct. Her argument
Cases of egregious misconduct make headlines. This
boils down to a claim that this lack of proof is simply evidence
is the same phenomenon that applies to all news. When media
of how effectively the secretive “culture of misconduct” is
coverage is criticized as too negative or sensationalistic, it is
operating.74 This reminds me of the old joke that prosecutors
often observed that no one reports on all the planes that don’t
tell about conspiracy: “Don’t worry if you have no evidence of
crash. Similarly, no one reports on the thousands of cases every
the conspiracy; that simply proves how effective the conspiraday where prosecutors fulfill their obligations and follow the
tors have been at covering it up!” One can only imagine how
rules. Those cases don’t make their way into the reported deciProfessor Davis, as a defense attorney, would justly ridicule any
sions or legal treatises. Nobody writes lengthy newspaper
prosecutor who leveled charges against a defendant with eviseries investigating how prosecutors are doing their jobs propdence as flimsy as that used by her to accuse all prosecutors.
erly. Like the thousands of safe airline flights every day, these
cases proceed unnoticed through the system, because the sysDon’t Go to Aruba!
tem is operating as it should.
Studies talking about a few dozen cases per year thereTo further attempt to bolster her claims of widespread
fore provide no support for claims of routine, widespread prosmisconduct, Professor Davis discusses the facts of a few specifecutorial misconduct. Professor Davis, however, has a response
ic cases where the prosecutors’ behavior was truly abhorrent.
to this: because much of what prosecutors do takes place in
From those cases, she then leaps to the conclusion that this type
secret, she says, a great deal of misconduct must occur that we
of misconduct is the norm. This is a flawed argument, a fallasimply never hear about.69 She notes darkly that “there are
cy known as Hasty Generalization.75 It is akin to discussing the
many opportunities for prosecutors to engage in misconduct
70
facts of the highly-publicized disappearance of Natalee
that are nearly impossible to discover.” Prosecutors interview
Holloway, and concluding that therefore most teenage girls who
witnesses, make charging decisions, conduct grand jury investravel to Aruba disappear without a trace 76
tigations, and carry out other duties shielded from the public
.
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For example, Professor Davis spends a fair amount of
time discussing the case of Delma Banks.77 The conduct of the
prosecutors in that case was indeed appalling: they concealed
evidence proving that the prosecution’s star witnesses had been
coached and had perjured themselves, and that one was a paid
government informant. They also knowingly relied on the perjured testimony to argue their case to the jury. Banks was convicted of murder and nearly executed before the Supreme Court
intervened.78 As Professor Davis notes, the misconduct was so
outrageous that a number of former judges and other public
officials – including several former U.S. attorneys, a former
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, and a former FBI
director – filed amicus briefs on Banks’ behalf.79
After discussing Banks, however, Professor Davis
makes the startling assertion that Brady violations “as egregious as those in Banks’ case” are “very common in prosecutors’ offices,” and that the prosecutorial misconduct in that case
was “not unusual.”80 In other words, she believes it is “very
common” and “not unusual” for prosecutors to coach witnesses
to lie, and to commit crimes themselves by knowingly sponsoring perjured testimony. This is the stuff of police states: kangaroo courts and show trials where the prosecution has no concern
for due process or the rule of law. If Professor Davis is correct
that such conduct is commonplace, then the foundations of the
criminal justice system have truly crumbled. Surely she must
have some convincing evidence to back up this serious accusation?
No, she does not. In fact, in support of her sweeping
charge, Professor Davis cites only a single article, written by a
law student, which actually makes no such claim and certainly
contains no facts to support such a claim.81 The reality, of
course, is that there is no support for the accusation that such
blatant misconduct is routine because that is simply not true.
The Banks case is notorious precisely because the misconduct
in that case was so unusual and shocking.82
Professor Davis makes a similar error when she argues
that prosecutors who engage in misconduct suffer no adverse
consequences. She discusses a handful of particular cases
before concluding that therefore “[m]ost prosecutors” who
engage in misconduct “not only escape punishment, but
advance in their careers.”83 This is the Aruba fallacy again:
because we can identify a few prosecutors who have been
accused of misconduct and have gone on to further their
careers, therefore this is what happens in “most” such cases.
Some of Professor Davis’s arguments in this area are
particularly interesting, coming from a former defense attorney.
For example, she discusses the trial of several prosecutors and
sheriff’s deputies indicted for alleged misconduct in an Illinois
case involving a defendant named Rolando Cruz.84 All of the
law enforcement defendants were ultimately acquitted, and several went on to advance in their careers. Professor Davis criticizes this result as evidence that misbehaving prosecutors are
rarely held to account. Ordinarily, one would expect a defense
attorney to argue that a defendant who is acquitted by a jury is
still presumed to be innocent and is fully entitled to get on with
his life. Perhaps this principle does not apply when the defendant is a prosecutor.85
Once again, discussing a handful of particular cases
proves nothing about what happens to “most” prosecutors who
commit misconduct. As Professor Davis acknowledges, many
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types of state bar disciplinary proceedings are not public.86
Federal prosecutors are also subject to investigation and discipline by the Department of Justice Office of Professional
Responsibility.87 Perhaps most important, the many forms of
internal discipline that take place – denial of a promotion,
denial of plum assignments, a negative performance evaluation
that affects a prosecutor’s salary, and the like – are confidential
personnel matters that are not made public.88 The truth is that
neither Professor Davis nor anyone else has sufficient information to say what happens to “most” prosecutors who engage in
wrongful behavior. It is safe to say, however, that there is no
reason to believe that prosecutors may routinely engage in
deliberate misconduct with no fear of professional repercussions.
Why Do Prosecutors Seek Justice?
I believe that most prosecutors, most of the time, try to
uphold their duty to seek justice and do not engage in deliberate misconduct. Other than my personal experiences with many
prosecutors over the years, why do I believe this is the case?
The first and most important reason is simply that it is
a prosecutor’s job to do so. As outlined above, prosecutors are
ethically, legally, and morally bound to seek justice; to see that
the guilty are punished but the innocent do not suffer. They are
required to prosecute only those they honestly believe to be
guilty, to safeguard the rights of the defendant, to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense, and to be completely candid with the court.
In the law, as in other fields, we generally presume that
practitioners will strive to follow the ethical and legal requirements of their profession. If this were not the case, codes of
professional conduct and other such rules would be of little use.
Prosecutors will strive to fulfill their obligation to seek justice
first and foremost because they are bound by law, ethics, and
their oaths of office to do so. I do not believe we should just
assume that such obligations have no affect on an individual.89
Indeed, this is what I find most remarkable about
Professor Davis’s article. She has no hesitation about impugning the character of tens of thousands of attorneys, despite the
lack of any solid support for her claims. She asserts that prosecutors – simply by virtue of their profession – routinely engage
in conduct that in many cases is not only unethical, but criminal. Apparently we are to presume that prosecutors, unlike
attorneys in any other area of practice, routinely disregard their
legal and ethical obligations when given the opportunity. I am
at a loss to understand how Professor Davis can make such a
broad accusation based on such flimsy evidence. Perhaps she
too believes that one cannot be both a good prosecutor and a
good person.
There is another, and much more practical, reason to
believe that prosecutors will generally play by the rules and try
to do the right thing: that is the type of prosecutor who is most
effective and, in the long run, most successful. Much of what a
prosecutor does depends upon the ability of others to trust her
word and her character. Judges must be willing to trust that
when the prosecutor makes a representation to them, it is the
truth. Witnesses must be able to rely on the prosecutor’s word
about what will happen at trial. Defense attorneys representing
a client who is considering pleading guilty and cooperating
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with the government must be able to trust the prosecutor’s word
concerning their client’s status and what the prosecution will do
in exchange for the client’s cooperation. A prosecutor who cannot be trusted cannot, in the long run, be successful.
The single most important asset that any prosecutor
has is his good name. Even in large cities, the criminal bar is a
relatively small community. If a prosecutor gains a reputation
for being dishonest or corrupt, the consequences will be
extremely damaging. For one thing, judges will no longer
accept the prosecutor’s word, which will make his day-to-day
life in court much more difficult. Unlike most attorneys, prosecutors regularly appear before the same judges time and time
again. Those judges make countless rulings in the prosecutor’s
cases, not only on substantive issues, but on matters such as
scheduling. A disgruntled judge has the ability to make a prosecutor’s life extremely unpleasant.90
Similarly, if defense attorneys believe that a prosecutor cannot be trusted, they will be less likely to advise their
clients to cooperate with the government. Without cooperating
witnesses, building any kind of major prosecution is virtually
impossible.91 A defense lawyer can also make an untrustworthy prosecutor’s life much more difficult simply by refusing to
engage in the informal give-and-take that normally takes place
concerning discovery, possible guilty pleas, and other matters.
Everything will become formalized. Defense counsel will
insist that everything be in writing and on the record, generating more work for the prosecutor. The defense also will be
more likely to file discovery motions and other pleadings seeking the court’s intervention if they feel the prosecutor cannot be
trusted to fulfill her obligations. These pleadings must be
responded to, further increasing the prosecutor’s workload.
Even juries have the ability to punish the unscrupulous
prosecutor. In a trial, if the prosecutor’s conduct draws repeated objections from the defense and admonitions from the judge,
the jury may come to believe that the prosecutor is not “playing
fair” and may register their disapproval with their verdict. On
a broader scale, if a prosecutor’s office gains a reputation in the
community for being unethical or for engaging in misconduct,
the public will come to distrust the prosecutor’s office. Because
the members of the community also make up the jury pools for
all of the office’s cases, this reputation will damage a prosecutor’s ability to win the confidence of a jury.
Finally, there is the matter of professional reputation
and standing. No prosecutor wants to have his name in a judicial opinion finding that he committed “misconduct.” In addition to tarnishing his professional reputation, any such finding,
whether or not it has merit, will likely result in disciplinary proceedings and reviews of the prosecutor’s conduct. None of this
will be very pleasant for the prosecutor. It is not a badge of
honor among prosecutors to be known as some kind of cowboy
who flaunts the rules. Just as a defense attorney presumably
does not relish a court finding that he rendered “ineffective
assistance of counsel,” so too a prosecutor has a personal and
professional interest in seeing that she retains a reputation for
fairness and competence.
In short, the best way for a prosecutor to be effective
and to advance her career is to be scrupulously fair and ethical.
An unethical or dishonest prosecutor may be able to secure a
conviction in a particular case, but over the long run the acts of
such a prosecutor will catch up with her.
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Conclusion
I believe that criminal prosecution is an honorable profession, and is one of the most rewarding jobs a lawyer can
have. Standing before a court and jury as the representative of
the people in a criminal proceeding is both humbling and
immensely gratifying. I never met a prosecutor who chose his
career out of some immoral lust for abusing witnesses and locking up innocent people. Lawyers become prosecutors because
they rightly see it as satisfying, fulfilling work and as an important service to the community. Those who work as prosecutors
often make considerable personal and financial sacrifices to
pursue a career in public service. They deserve better than to
be tarred by sweeping, unsupported attacks on their ethics and
character.
* Randall Eliason served as an Assistant United States
Attorney for the District of Columbia from 1989 to 2001 and
was the Chief of the Public Corruption/Government Fraud
Section from 1999 to 2001. He is a Professorial Lecturer in
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